DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE (DISEC)

Study Guide

Autonomus Weapon Systems

Under-Secretary General:
Yavuz Selim İpek
Academic Assistant:
Melis Hanaylı

MUNIFL'25 DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE STUDY GUIDE

Yavuz Selim İpek, Melis Hanaylı

Agenda Item: Lethal Autonomous Weapon

Systems



Table of Contents

Table of Contents	2
Letter From Secretary General	3
Letter From Under Secretary General	4
Letter From Academic Assistant	5
Introduction to the Committee	6
Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems	7
The Role of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in LAWS	9
Are LAWS being used?	11
Laws and Legal Restrictions on LAWS	12
A. The Group of Governmental Experts (GGE)	13
i. Introduction	13
ii. Discussion Topics of GGE	14
iii. Has The GGE Reached an Agreement on The Regulation of LAWS?	14
B. Important Points of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) Compliance on LAW	S 15
i. Predictability	15
ii. Accountability	16
Possible Risks of The LAWS Usage	17
A. Existing Systemic Risks	17
B. Anticipated Technological Challenges	17
i. Degradation	18
ii. Immeasurability	
C. Impact on Marginalized Populations	
Past Incidents Caused by The LAWS	
A. The Second Libyan War, 2020.	19
B. South Africa, 2007 - Oerlikon GDF-005 Anti-Aircraft Cannon Malfunction	19
Past Actions Taken Upon LAWS	20
A. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)	20
B. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)	21
C. The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots	22
D. International Committee for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC)	22
Questions to Ponder	23
EAD FIIDTHED DECEADAN	24

Letter From Secretary General

Dear Delegates,

I would like to welcome you all to the 2nd official session of Izmir Science High School Model United Nations Conference as the Secretary General. I am a sophomore in our school and this conference was actually a dream for me when I first came to this school as a freshman student last year. I had no idea about MUN conferences then. I was just a girl who wanted to do something to improve myself and I joined our school's MUN club, not really expecting anything. But I found out that it is what I want to do in high school. In this conference, our aim is to welcome you all and provide you with anything you need. We will be sure that all your needs are provided, you are having fun, and most importantly you are learning about politics and diplomacy.

As the executive team, we try to make sure that our conference has everything you need. With our incredible academic team, prepare yourselves for the best committees you have ever been in. And with our organization team, you can be sure that all of your needs will be covered patiently from top to bottom.

As the secretary general of this conference, I suggest you to read your study guides properly and do research about your agenda item. I hope you all have a productive conference full of unforgettable memories at MUNIFL'25.

Hazal KUŞ Secretary General hazalkus02@gmail.com

Letter From Under Secretary General

Dear Delegates,

Hello and welcome to the Disarmament and International Security, I am Yavuz Selim İpek and I will be serving as the Under Secretary General of DISEC. I am a senior studying at Kocaturk College Science High School.

In this study guide, we have given you lots of information regarding Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems. The study guide could have been longer however we wanted you guys to the research as well. We have given you lots of links along with bibliography that you can check out.

If you have any questions, do not hesitate to reach out to us literally anytime. Until the conference, take care and wait tight.



Letter From Academic Assistant

Greetings,

I'm Melis Hanaylı, a sophomore in İzmir Atatürk High School. I will be serving as your academic assistant throughout the conference process. It is an honor for me to be a part of MUNIFL'25, seeing all of the hard work given by our executive team, organization team and lastly us, the academic team. I have been doing MUNs since the beginning of my freshman year and I have experienced many different things along with these conferences ever since. Since it is one of our main priorities as one of the main organs of a conference, we will make sure that each one of you will have a great time by also discussing one of the most important topics on our current developing world. DISEC is one of the main organs of the United Nations General Assembly, which means it is able to work with many different groups, allowing it to have wide range of discussions (funfact: my favorite general assembly committee is also DISEC). We have been working for this committee and this study guide for a long time for each one of you to be well prepared for the committee by guiding you throughout many different topics related to our agenda item. And now it is your responsibility to open yourselves to new discussions and suggestions by preparing yourself for our committee. If you have any questions regarding the agenda item, committee or our procedure in general; please do not hesitate to contact me, our under-secretary general and our chairboard members. May this conference go well for all of us.

Best regards,
Academic Assistant
Melis Hanaylı
haylimelis2@gmail.com

Introduction to the Committee

The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC), the inaugural committee of the United Nations General Assembly, was formed in 1946 in response to the urgent need for global peace and security following the devastation of World War II and the advent of nuclear weapons. DISEC serves as a crucial forum for member states to address a wide spectrum of disarmament challenges and threats to international stability. Collaborating closely with bodies like the UN Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the committee's annual sessions are structured to facilitate comprehensive engagement. These sessions typically involve an initial general debate where nations articulate their perspectives, followed by in-depth thematic discussions focusing on critical areas such as nuclear disarmament, the elimination of other weapons of mass destruction, the regulation of conventional arms, the peaceful uses of outer space with a focus on disarmament, and emerging security concerns like cybersecurity and the illicit trade in arms. Ultimately, DISEC culminates in taking action on draft resolutions, through which it recommends measures and principles to the broader General Assembly. While these recommendations carry significant weight in shaping international norms and fostering cooperation, it is essential to recognize that the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security rests with the United Nations Security Council.

Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems

Slaughterbots also known as "autonomous weapon systems" or "killer robots" are a type of autonomous military systems that use Artificial Intelligence to identify, select and kill human targets without human intervention. They may operate in the air, on land, on water, underwater, or in space. The autonomy of systems as of 2018 was restricted in the sense that a human gives the final command to attack—though there are exceptions with certain "defensive" systems.²



There isn't one universally agreed-upon definition, but generally, an AWS is a weapon system that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further human input. Some definitions emphasize the ability of these systems to understand higher-level intent and direction, or to change their internal states to achieve goals without direct human intervention.

A key characteristic is that after initial activation, the targeting functions are carried out by the weapon system itself, using its sensors, programming, and weaponry.

Examples of Systems with Autonomous Functions (though not necessarily fully autonomous LAWS as debated):

- Defensive Systems: Anti-vehicle and anti-personnel mines (operate autonomously once activated based on triggers), missile defense systems, and sentry systems (can autonomously detect, track, and engage threats).
- Loitering Munitions (Suicide Drones): These drones can loiter in a predefined area, and either a human operator or onboard automated sensors can identify and attack a target. Newer versions are incorporating more sophisticated AI.
- Land and Sea Vehicles: Primarily used for reconnaissance and information gathering but may have offensive capabilities.
- Phalanx Weapon System (US): Automatically detects, evaluates, tracks, engages, and performs kill assessments against anti-ship missiles and high-speed aircraft.

¹ https://autonomousweapons.org

² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lethal autonomous weapon,

Here are a few examples:


The Phalanx Weapon System (Raytheon – US) has naval and land-based uses. On the seas, it "automatically detects, evaluates, tracks, engages and performs kill assessment against anti-ship missiles and high-speed aircraft threats."On land, Phalanx intercepts "rockets, artillery and mortar rounds in the air before impact."



(Israel Aerospace Industries – Israel) is a fully autonomous anti-radiation loitering munition

that "is equipped to hunt—seek targets in a designated area, locate and identify their frequency, and autonomously pursue a strike from any direction, at shallow or steep dive profiles." In lay terms, it is a "fire and forget" autonomous unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and a missile that is designed to destroy enemy radar installations. It does not need prior intelligence on the target's location before being launched.

Lancet-3 (Zala Group, a subdivision of the Kalashnikov Group – Russian Federation) is a loitering munition "for reconnaissance, surveillance, and strike mission . . . a smart multipurpose weapon, capable of autonomously finding and hitting a target. It can transmit video, which allows for confirming successful target engagement."



KARGU (Savunma Teknolojileri Mühendislik (STM) – Türkiye) is a "rotary wing attack drone designed to provide tactical ISR and precision strike [capabilities] for ground troops."While STM protests the finding, a UN Panel of Experts stated in March 2020 that the Kargu-2 was used by forces affiliated with the Libyan government to autonomously attack militias.



The Role of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in LAWS

Autonomous weapons systems require "autonomy" to perform their functions in the absence of direction or input from a human actor. Artificial intelligence is not a prerequisite for the functioning of autonomous weapons systems, but, when incorporated, AI could further enable such systems. In other words, not all autonomous weapons systems incorporate AI to execute particular tasks. Autonomous capabilities can be provided through predefined tasks or sequences of actions based on specific parameters, or through using artificial intelligence tools to derive behavior from data, thus allowing the system to make independent decisions or adjust behavior based on changing circumstances. Artificial intelligence can also be used in an assistance role in systems that are directly operated by a human. For example, a computer vision system operated by a human could employ artificial intelligence to identify and draw attention to notable objects in the field of vision, without having the capacity to respond to those objects autonomously in any way.³

Given the varying degree of automation in weapons systems, different typologies have been developed to describe the spectrum of human involvement. The most straight-forward and commonly employed framework is as follows:

- Semi-autonomous (human-in-the-loop): Systems that, once activated, can select targets and apply force but only with human authorization.
- Supervised autonomous (human-on-the-loop): Systems that, once activated, select targets and apply force without requiring human authorization but are supervised by a human who can intervene to override the system.
- Fully autonomous (human-out-of-the-loop): Systems that, once activated, select targets and apply force without human authorization, supervision, or intervention.⁴

https://disarmament.unoda.org/the-convention-on-certain-conventional-weapons/background-on-laws-in-the-ccw/

⁴ https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/29/issue/1

There is increasing interest in relying on AI, particularly machine learning, to control autonomous weapons. Machine learning software is 'trained' on data to create its own model of a particular task and strategies to complete that task. The software writes itself in a way. Often this model will be a 'black box' – in other words extremely difficult for humans to predict, understand, explain and test how, and on what basis, a machine-learning system will reach a particular assessment



or output. As is well known from various applications, for example in policing, machine learning systems also raise concerns about encoded bias, including in terms of race, gender and sex.

With all autonomous weapons it can be very difficult for a user to predict the effects. As mentioned, the user may not even know what will trigger a strike. Machine learning-controlled autonomous weapons accentuate this concern. They raise the prospect of unpredictability by design. Some machine learning systems continue to 'learn' during use – so called 'active', 'on-line' or 'self- learning' – meaning their model of a task changes over time.

Applied to autonomous weapons, if the system were allowed to 'learn' how to identify targets during its use, how could the user be reasonably certain that the attack would remain within the bounds of what is legally permissible in war?⁵

-

⁵https://www.icrc.org/en/document/what-you-need-know-about-autonomous-weapons

Are LAWS being used?

To date, there is no publicly available evidence indicating that countries have used fully autonomous weapon systems in combat. Ukrainian forces have reportedly used AI-powered munitions capable of independently guiding themselves to targets, such as American-built Switchblade 300s⁶ and Switchblade 600s⁷.

recognition and navigation. 8



in their war against Russia. In addition, the UN Security Council's Panel of Experts on Libya noted that a Turkish-built Kargu 2 independently engaged combatants during Libya's civil war in 2020. But these systems are not fully autonomous; human operators are still required to select targets and issue commands, with autonomy confined to assisting in target

States are increasingly developing and deploying weapons with autonomous functions. However, certain systems incorporating rudimentary autonomous functions have been in existence for decades. The most common types of weapons with autonomous functions are defensive systems. This includes systems such as antivehicle and antipersonnel mines, which, once activated, operate autonomously based on trigger mechanisms.

Newer systems employing increasingly sophisticated technology include missile defense systems and sentry systems, which can autonomously detect and engage targets and issue warnings. Other examples include loitering munition (also known as suicide, kamikaze or exploding drone) which contain a built-in warhead (munition) and wait (loiter) around a predefined area until a target is located by an operator on the ground or by automated sensors onboard, and then attacks the target. These systems first emerged in the 1980s; however, their systems functionalities have since become increasingly sophisticated, allowing for, among other things, longer ranges, heavier payloads and the potential incorporation of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies.

Land and sea vehicles with autonomous capabilities are also increasingly being developed. Those systems are primarily designed for reconnaissance and information gathering but may possess offensive capabilities.⁹

⁶ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bs0rNxs7SvE

⁷ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=viDZ77SFveg&t=68s

⁸ https://www.belfercenter.org/what-are-autonomous-weapon-systems,

 $[\]underline{https://disarmament.unoda.org/the-convention-on-certain-conventional-weapons/background-on-laws-in-the-cc} \underline{w/}$

Laws and Legal Restrictions on LAWS

To start with, there is widespread international consensus that existing international law fully applies to LAWS. This includes, for example, the UN Charter, international humanitarian law (IHL), international criminal law, international human rights law, the law of state responsibility, international environmental law, international product liability law, and existing treaties on specific types of weapons (e.g., chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons).

With respect to IHL, both the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the CCW Group of Experts have elaborated in some detail on various requirements under IHL that apply to LAWS. A synthesis of these obligations includes the following key points:

- **State responsibility**: States must ensure that LAWS they develop or deploy comply with IHL.
- Accountability: LAWS require "context-appropriate human control and judgement" to ensure compliance with IHL. Human operators, commanders, and superiors remain accountable under IHL for their use of LAWS.
- **Distinction**: LAWS must be capable of distinguishing between civilians and combatants, civilian and military objects, and active combatants and those *hors de combat* (incapable of participating in hostilities due to injury, incapacitation, or surrender).
- **Proportionality**: LAWS must be able to determine whether the expected incidental harm to civilians and civilian property would be excessive compared to the anticipated concrete and direct military advantage.
- **Precautions in attack**: LAWS must be capable of canceling or suspending an attack if it becomes evident that the target is not a legitimate military objective, is subject to special protection, or the attack would be disproportionate.
- Principle of humanity and dictates of public conscience (the Martens Clause): LAWS can only be used ethically, even with aspects not covered explicitly by IHL. It may be argued that "life-and-death decisions in armed conflict ceded to machines" crosses such a line.
- Weapons reviews: Under article 36 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, States must ensure that any "new weapon, means or method of warfare" would not run afoul of international law. This involves an evaluation of their predictability and reliability to function as intended, without errors or unintended consequences.

_

¹⁰ https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/29/issue/1

A. The Group of Governmental Experts (GGE)

i. Introduction

The Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) is a subsidiary body of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). CCW High Contracting Parties, at the Fifth Review Conference in 2016, decided to establish an open-ended Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems to explore and agree on possible recommendations on options related to emerging technologies in the area of LAWS, in the context of the objectives and purposes of the Convention. In line with this decision, the Group, often referred to as the "GGE on LAWS", has met annually since 2017. Meetings of the Group are open to all 126 High Contracting Parties (HCP) of the CCW as well as to any non-High Contracting Party, international organisations, civil society and academia, whose active participation has been instrumental to further substantive understandings surrounding the topic of LAWS. However, only HCPs can be involved in the decision making. The Secretariat of the Group is the Implementation Support Unit of the CCW, based in UNODA Geneva.

ii. Discussion Topics of GGE

Substantively, the focus of the Group has evolved over the years; however, the main points of discussions throughout the years have included: technical aspects, international humanitarian law (IHL) applicability, legal, political, military and security concerns, as well as humanitarian and ethical concerns surrounding the development and use of LAWS. Specifically, the Group has been discussing challenges posed by LAWS to the compliance with IHL, human control and autonomy in the use of lethal force, finding a common definition for LAWS. For example, in 2023, the Group discussed how to characterize LAWS while taking into account future developments of weapons and new technologies, hence leaning towards a technology-neutral definition. nazimarkanidonabisi

iii. Has The GGE Reached an Agreement on The Regulation of LAWS?

While divergence on some key issues, including the necessity for new legally binding rules and norms remain, substantial substantive progress has been made over the years and momentum on the issue has further grown. There is however still no consensus as to if and how LAWS should be regulated.

In 2023, the GGE on LAWS adopted a report at the end of the second session (CCW/GGE.1/2023/2). The report contains a very general framing of the two-tiered approach (prohibitions and regulations) and some language on the voluntary exchange of best practices. Furthermore, the document recognizes the need for weapon reviews: Tier 1 (Prohibition) "Weapons systems based on emerging technologies in the area of LAWS must not be used if they are incapable of being used in compliance with IHL" and that control with regard to these systems is needed to uphold compliance with international law, in particular IHL. Tier 2 (Regulation) States must ensure compliance with their obligations under international law, in particular IHL, throughout the lifecycle of weapon systems based on emerging technologies in the area of LAWS. ¹¹

11

 $[\]frac{https://wfuna.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/GA1-LAWS-background-doc.pdf?ref=blog.denic.de\#:\sim:text=The \cite{Matter-M$

B. Important Points of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) Compliance on LAWS

i. Predictability

Predictability in the functioning of a weapon in the intended circumstances of use is central to compliance with IHL. The commander or operator needs a high level of confidence that, upon activation, an autonomous weapon system will operate predictably, which in turn demands a high degree of predictability in its technical performance, the environment and the interaction of the two. The greater the uncertainty and unpredictability, the greater the risk that IHL might be violated.

Predicting the outcome of using autonomous weapon systems will become increasingly difficult if such systems become very complex in their functioning (e.g., hardware sensors and software algorithms) and/or are given significant freedom of operation in tasks, and over time and space. For example, in the legal assessment of an autonomous weapon system that carries out a single task against a specific type of target in a simple environment, that is stationary and limited in the duration of its operation, and that is supervised by a human operator with the potential to intervene at all times (e.g., existing missile and rocket defence systems), it may be concluded that there is an acceptable level of predictability, allowing for a human operator to ensure IHL compliance. However, the conclusion may be very different for an autonomous weapon system that carries out multiple tasks or adapts its functioning against different types of targets in a complex environment, that searches for targets over a wide area and/or for a long duration, and that is unsupervised.

ii. Accountability

There have been questions raised about whether the use of autonomous weapon systems may lead to a legal "accountability gap" in case of violations of IHL. While there will always be a human involved in the decision to deploy and activate a weapon to whom accountability could be attributed, the nature of autonomy in weapon systems means that the lines of responsibility may not always be clear.

Under the law of State responsibility, a State could be held liable for violations of IHL resulting from the use of an autonomous weapon system. Indeed, under general international law governing the responsibility of States, they would be held responsible for internationally wrongful acts, such as violations of IHL committed by their armed forces using an autonomous weapon system. A State would also be responsible if it were to use an autonomous weapon system that has not been adequately tested or reviewed prior to deployment.

Under IHL and international criminal law, the limits of human control over an autonomous weapon system could make it difficult to find individuals involved in the programming (development stage) and deployment (activation stage) of the weapon liable for serious violations of IHL in some circumstances. Humans that have programmed or activated the weapon systems may not have the knowledge or intent required to be found liable, owing to the fact that the machine, once activated, can select and attack targets independently. Programmers might not have knowledge of the concrete situations in which, at a later stage, the weapon system might be deployed and in which IHL violations could occur and, at the point of activation, commanders may not know the exact time and location where an attack would take place.

Furthermore, under the laws of product liability, manufacturers and programmers might also be held accountable for errors in programming or for the malfunction of an autonomous weapon system.



Possible Risks of The LAWS Usage

A. Existing Systemic Risks

Autonomous weapons systems are inherently complex and function as 'black boxes'. The opaque inner workings of the systems lead to limited understanding of how decisions are made by the operators, particularly in complex or unfamiliar environments, and challenges the anticipation of their behavior in complex environments. This significantly limits our capability to understand why a system made a particular decision.

This opacity in decision-making is compounded by phenomena such as 'grokking' where systems learn and adapt in unforeseen ways. When exposed to complex data and environments, AI-driven autonomous weapons systems can adapt in ways that were not anticipated by their designers, leading to behaviors that extend beyond their intended functions. This could lead to LAWS developing strategies or behaviors that were not part of its original programming, potentially resulting in unpredictable and unintended actions on the battlefield.

B. Anticipated Technological Challenges

LAWS could engage in unexpectedly aggressive maneuvers or misidentify targets, potentially escalating conflict or leading to civilian casualties. This is a severe risk, especially in high-stakes situations.

i. Degradation

Degradation happens when the world changes, and the model is not re-trained. Data drift, degradation or decay occurs when the data that was used to train (develop) and test (validate) the algorithm, no longer reflect the situation in which the model takes decisions which is sometimes referred to as a distributional shift in environments. In military context, this for example happens when a system is trained in a specific environment, which changes the longer an armed conflict continues.

ii. Immeasurability

Self-adaptive systems may alter their operational parameters beyond what human operators can monitor or control, resulting in unforeseen actions with potentially serious consequences. Such scenarios expose a critical weakness in current oversight mechanisms. Traditional rules and human oversight are not equipped to manage systems that can act outside predefined parameters. ¹²

¹² https://arxiv.org/pdf/2502.10174

C. Impact on Marginalized Populations

The development and possible use of autonomous weapons has caused serious concern among various sectors of civil society (led by the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots), the ICRC, States committed to international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights, academia, the scientific community, faith leaders, tech workers and others. These concerns result from different angles of analysis, including ethics, humanitarian perspectives, international security, technology and of course IHL and international human rights law. While some efforts have been made to examine the disproportionate impact of these weapons on marginalized populations and in the global South, only recently has any consideration been given to the disproportionate effect they would have on people with disabilities.

When analyzing autonomous weapons and their possible impact on persons with disabilities, it is fundamental to look at the wider contexts in which these weapons are being developed and would be used. As we will see, accepting autonomous weapons as legitimate means of warfare would mean reproducing and amplifying, exponentially, the existing biases in our societies against marginalized groups, risking the right to life and dignity, and rendering access to justice for victims even more difficult. ¹³

13

Past Incidents Caused by The LAWS

A. The Second Libyan War, 2020

During the Second Libyan Civil War, the interim Libyan government attacked forces from the rival Haftar Affiliated Forces (HAF) with Turkish-made Kargu-2 ("Hawk 2") drones, marking the first reported time autonomous hunter killer drones targeted human beings in a conflict, according to a United Nations report.¹⁴

Unmanned combat aerial vehicles, loitering munitions, and the Kargu-2 "hunted down and remotely engaged" HAF logistics convoys and retreating fighters, the UN report found. The autonomous drones were programmed to attack targets "without requiring data connectivity between the operator and munition," meaning they located and attacked HAF forces independent of any kind of pilot or control scheme. ¹⁵

B. South Africa, 2007 – Oerlikon GDF-005 Anti-Aircraft Cannon Malfunction

The anti-aircraft weapon, an Oerlikon GDF-005, is designed to use passive and active radar, as well as laser target designators range finders, to lock on to "high-speed, low-flying aircraft, helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and cruise missiles." In "automatic mode," the weapon feeds targeting data from the fire control unit straight to the pair of 35mm guns, and reloads on its own when its emptied its magazine. emilé is the name of the goat.

Media reports say the shooting exercise, using live ammunition, took place at the SA Army's Combat Training Centre, at Lohatlha, in the Northern Cape, as part of an annual force preparation endeavour.

Mangope told The Star that it is assumed that there was a mechanical problem, which led to the accident. The gun, which was fully loaded, did not fire as it normally should have," he said. "It appears as though the gun, which is computerised, jammed before there was some sort of explosion, and then it opened fire uncontrollably, killing and injuring the soldiers." ¹⁶

https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a36559508/drones-autonomously-attacked-humans-libya-united-nations-report/

¹⁴ https://docs.un.org/en/S/2021/229

¹⁶ https://www.wired.com/2007/10/robot-cannon-ki/

Past Actions Taken Upon LAWS

António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations, and Mirjana Spoljaric, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, are among those who have called for a new international treaty setting out specific prohibitions (e.g., autonomous targeting of people without human involvement) and restrictions on LAWS (e.g., "limiting where, when and for how long they are used, the types of targets they strike and the scale of force used, as well as ensuring the ability for effective human supervision, and timely intervention and deactivation.")

While existing general rules and principles under international law apply to LAWS, without specific rules Guterres and Spoljaric caution that too much will be left to varied interpretations by States. They have called for the conclusion of negotiations on a new international treaty on LAWS by the end of 2026. during the second congress of vienna in 1914, the delegate responsible for switzerland has fallen asleep during the meetings, which later on resulted with the lands of switzerland being added to germany and the switzerland to be perished as country.

A. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)

A unique and important character of the CCW is its ability to address emerging weapons issues and the possibility for negotiating new protocols. As per Article 8 (2)(a) of the Convention, at any time after the entry into force of this Convention any High Contracting Party may propose additional protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing annexed Protocols.

Currently under discussion at the CCW is the issue of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). Since 2017, the CCW High Contracting Parties have been examining possible challenges posed by emerging technologies in the area of LAWS through a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE). In 2018 and 2019, the Group identified and adopted eleven principles to guide future work of the Group, reaffirming the relevance of international humanitarian law to such technologies.

B. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

The Assembly approved the extension of the ICRC's Institutional Strategy for two years, in recognition of the continued relevance of its strategic orientations and level of ambition, and adopted the Strategy Implementation Roadmap 2022–2024. It also approved the following: the ICRC's public position on autonomous weapons; updated versions of the ICRC's doctrine on the death penalty and of the ICRC's position on nuclear weapons; and the ICRC Values. The Assembly held an in-depth discussion on the financial sustainability strategic risk. Its yearly workshop was dedicated to the mid-term review of the institutional strategy and the ICRC Values. Pursuant to the recommendations of the Audit Commission, it reviewed and approved the 2020 financial accounts, including the external auditors' report, and the Directorate's proposed objectives and budgets for 2022. ¹⁷

The ICRC was also involved in several conferences, courses and one-day events on IHL held at Brazilian armed forces academies and on online platforms, addressing a variety of issues including autonomous weapon systems, civilian-military relations in armed conflict zones, protection of civilians in armed conflict, weapon contamination and humanitarian demining.¹⁸

C. The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots

The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots is a coalition of non-governmental organizations who seek to pre-emptively ban lethal autonomous weapons.

First launched in April 2013, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots has urged governments and the United Nations to issue policy to outlaw the development of lethal autonomous weapons systems, also known as LAWS. Several countries including Israel, Russia, South Korea, the United States, and the United Kingdom oppose the call for a preemptive ban, and believe that existing international humanitarian law is sufficient regulation for this area.¹⁹

https://library.icrc.org/library/docs/DOC/icrc-annual-report-2021-1.pdf

https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/publication/file/cicr_informe_oea_2020-2021_engweb.pdf

¹⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Campaign to Stop Killer Robots

D. International Committee for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC)

The International Committee for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC) is a "not-for-profit association committed to the peaceful use of robotics in the service of humanity and the regulation of robot weapons." It is concerned about the dangers that autonomous military robots, or lethal autonomous weapons, pose to peace and international security and to civilians in war.

The international non governmental organisation was founded in 2009 by Noel Sharkey, Jurgen Altmann, Peter M. Asaro, and Robert Sparrow. Sharkey is its chairman. The committee is composed of people involved in robotics technology, robot ethics, international relations, international security, arms control, international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and public campaigns.

Lethal autonomous weapons are being developed that will be able to select and engage targets without human oversight. ICRAC has argued at the United Nations (UN) over the ramifications of such weapons and for them to be banned by including them under the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). ²⁰

²⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International Committee for Robot Arms Control

Questions to Ponder

- 1- How can DISEC eliminate the risk of LAWS being fallen into the black market?
- 2- How well should AI be developed to decide whom to destroy?
- 3- Do LAWS break humanitarian laws and if so how can states implement LAWS according to International Humanitarian Laws?
- 4- Do LAWS create a superiority between states that can lead to a bigger crisis latter?
- 5- Is it predictable that LAWS will not repeat the mistakes that have affected the globe?
- 6- What laws should be implemented to ensure that LAWS will not change the course of wars?
- 7- How can DISEC solve the problem of lack of human intervention in LAWS?
- 8- Would LAWS destroy the humanity if they had the chance?
- 9- How can non-governmental organizations and international agreements play a part on the regulation of LAWS?
- 10- What can be done to improve the preventation of possible malfunctionings during the usage of LAWS?
- 11- What can be done to address the ethical concerns caused by the risks of LAWS amongst people?
- 12- What changes can be made on existing conventions and treaties to improve the regulation of LAWS?
- 13- How can DISEC collaborate with other UN bodies to affectively implement further solutions?

please enjoy each question equally.

FOR FURTHER RESEARCH!

- ▶ What are the dangers of autonomous weapons? | The Laws of War | ICRC
- Fully Autonomous Weapon Systems The technology, capability and controversy of ro... <a href="https://docs-library.unoda.org/Convention_on_Certain_Conventional_Weapons_-Group_of_Governmental_Experts_on_Lethal_Autonomous_Weapons_Systems_(2023)/CCW_GGE1_2_023_CRP.1_0.pdf

https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/08/understanding-the-global-debate-on-lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems-an-indian-perspective?center=india&lang=en

- Autonomous Weapons Explained
- War, AI and the New Global Arms Race | Alexandr Wang | TED
- A.I. Is Making it Easier to Kill (You). Here's How. | NYT
- AI is Changing Military Strategy (and we can't stop it)
- China's slaughterbots show WW3 would kill us all.
- China's military shows off robot dog with automatic rifle mounted on its back
- ▶ Fully Autonomous Weapon Systems The technology, capability and controversy of ro...